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THE IMPACT OF TAX-EXEMPT STATUS:
THE SUPPLY-SIDE SUBSIDIES
RICHARD L. SCHMALBECK*
I
INTRODUCTION
In their impressive article, “Distributive Injustice(s) in American Health
Care,” Clark Havighurst and Barak Richman offer several observations about
the ways in which American tax law subsidizes nonprofit health care providers,
particularly hospitals. They argue that, because qualification for exempt status
for a nonprofit hospital requires a demonstration that the hospital will crosssubsidize some services by excess charges imposed on others, only hospitals
enjoying monopoly profits can qualify.1 One of several consequences is a
perverse tendency to impose unjustified charges, which fall largely on those
middle-income employees who have health insurance, in order to provide the
wherewithal for the subsidies of lower-income patients.2 Another consequence
is that nonprofit hospitals, being monopolists that are barred from distributing
profits to shareholders, will tend to accumulate large, and largely unnecessary,
surpluses.3 Because their charters typically prohibit the use of these surpluses
for any purpose other than provision of health care, there is a tendency for the
most successful of these hospitals to become bloated, trapping resources in ways
that lead to, and reflect, inefficient investments in health care.4
Some of these things are certainly true, and all of them may be so. It is
certainly true that tax rules are a critically important part of the economic
framework that underlies health economics in the United States. However, the
features of greatest importance are not the ones mentioned in the preceding
paragraph. Rather, the primary tax rules driving American health care
economics are the exclusion of employer-provided health insurance from the
gross income of employees5 and the deductibility of extraordinary medical
expenses by the individuals who bear them.6 These features have been
Copyright © 2006 by Richard L. Schmalbeck
This article is also available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/lcp.
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1. Clark C. Havighurst and Barak D. Richman, Distributive Injustice(s) in American Health Care,
69 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 20–22 (Autumn 2006).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 16.
4. Id. at 20.
5. I.R.C. §§ 105, 106 (2005).
6. I.R.C. § 213 (2005). This provision is accurately described as allowing only extraordinary
expenses as deductions because it imposes a nondeductible floor on deductions equal to 7.5% of the
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described and analyzed in Lawrence Zelenak’s insightful article in this issue.7
They constitute something of a demand-side subsidy, enabling consumers to
purchase more health care than they often would purchase, or would want to
purchase, otherwise.
Havighurst and Richman appear to agree on the primacy of the healthinsurance and expense-deduction rules, but they go beyond that to argue that
some of what might be called the supply-side tax features, which provide
subsidies to certain qualifying nonprofit providers of health care, are also
important.8 However, these tax rules may well have less significance than
Havighurst and Richman seem to accord them. In particular, while some
element of cross-subsidy remains a benchmark for exemption, the requirement
has become so attenuated over time that its economic importance would now
appear to be minimal. And, although nonprofit hospitals may indeed have
become vessels of inefficient creation and storage of huge surpluses, this effect
is difficult to prove and in any case may be ambiguous in its effects on the
economics of American health care.
This article first provides some background and history of the tax rules
governing nonprofit health care institutions, then assesses the significance of the
subsidies these tax rules create. Such significance is, in short, negligible: the
subsidies do not bring any very impressive forces to bear on the market for
health care.
II
BACKGROUND: HISTORY OF THE
EXEMPTION OF HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS
A. The Section 501(c)(3) Exemption
The centerpiece of the supply-side subsidies in the American health care
system is the exemption, under Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 501(c)(3),9
from the corporate income tax enjoyed directly by the institutions in question.
Some additional ancillary benefits flow indirectly from the tax exemption,
including the deductibility of contributions made to those organizations by
donors,10 which undoubtedly benefits the exempt institutions by stimulating
such contributions; the ability to issue bonds whose interest payments are

taxpayer’s adjusted gross income. Id. As a consequence, fewer than nine million taxpayers were able
to claim a medical expense deduction in 2003—a number that is just 19.7% of all taxpayers who itemize
their deductions and less than 6.7% of all taxpayers in the aggregate. Richard L. Schmalbeck,
unpublished calculation (on file with author) (based on Michael Parisi and Scott Hollenbeck, Individual
Income Tax Returns, 2003, 25 STAT. OF INCOME BULL., No. 2, at 9, 25, 42 (Fall 2005)).
7. Lawrence Zelenak, Of Head Taxes, Income Taxes, and Distributive Justice in American Health
Care, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103 (Autumn 2006).
8. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 22–23.
9. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2005).
10. I.R.C. § 170(a) (2005).
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exempt from the federal income tax,11 a feature that lowers the cost of capital
available to institutions permitted to issue such bonds; and exemption from
certain state and local taxes.12 These features are generally of lesser and more
ambiguous effects than their demand-side counterparts, but may still influence
the shape of health care in this country in important ways.
The availability in the health care industry of the subsidy provided by these
supply-side tax features is at first puzzling. When one reads the list of
categories of organizations entitled to these benefits, it is not immediately
evident that there is a category into which a modern nonprofit hospital easily
falls. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) allows exemption for corporations and similar
organizations that are “organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes,
or to foster national or international amateur sports competition . . . or for the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals . . . .”13 Some hospitals do, of
course, perform research, and those same hospitals often provide medical
education to students, as well as to recently credentialed doctors and nurses.
And some hospitals are operated by religious orders. However, it would only
rarely be true that educational, scientific, or religious activities would be the
primary focus of a medical center. The primary focus is instead upon the
treatment of injuries and diseases. How does this focus fit in the matrix of
exemption-eligible categories listed above?
It really does not fit; but nonprofit hospitals are nevertheless regarded as
eligible for exempt status on the grounds that they are within the more general
“charitable” category of § 501(c)(3). That view, however, is more than a little
anachronistic as applied to a medical center in the twenty-first century.
Although the “charitable” category is something of a catch-all—a residual
description of organizations that seem somehow deserving of this status—its
primary usage is intended to connote organizations whose mission is “relief of
the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged.”14 It was substantially
accurate to view hospitals in that way a century ago, when the range of medical
treatments available was much more limited than it is today and hospitals were
frequently little more than dormitories for those who were too ill or infirm to
provide for their own sustenance and who had no wealth or family resources on
which to draw for support.
Today’s hospital is quite a different enterprise, and a dormitory is one of the
things it least resembles. The modern hospital houses patients only reluctantly,
and then only those in need of the most acute care. Rather than house patients

11. I.R.C. §§ 103(a), 141(e)(1)(G), 145(a) (2005). See infra note 57 for further detail on exempt
bond financing.
12. See text and infra notes 58, 59.
13. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). This language permits exemption from tax for the organization. Similar
language allowing donors to deduct their contributions is found at I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B), except that the
latter provision does not allow deductions for public-safety testing organizations.
14. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(2) (1990).
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(or the “sick–poor,” as the hospital population was formerly called15), today’s
hospitals primarily house expensive diagnostic and treatment equipment and a
highly skilled labor force, which together provide very specialized services to
patients across a broad range of economic circumstances. Although practices
vary widely, the bias in selection of patients is generally not in the direction of
serving the poor, but precisely the opposite: the doors are always open to the
wealthy and the well-insured, but more grudgingly, if at all, to others.
Nevertheless, the availability of exempt status persists. Those who make
and interpret the tax laws have not been completely oblivious to the gradually
changing nature of hospitals, but have apparently preferred a series of awkward
accommodations of reality to the more difficult task of fundamental tax reform.
A brief sketch of those awkward accommodations will help inform our sense of
how far the law has strayed from a coherent policy view of the supply-side
subsidy embodied in the exemption and charitable contribution rules relating to
hospitals.
B. Treasury Guidance on Exemption Standards
Although the exemption and its accompanying charitable deduction have
been a part of the tax landscape from the beginning,16 very little official
guidance from the Treasury or Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) appeared
before the mid-1950s. A landmark ruling, Revenue Ruling 56-185, was issued in
1956, providing a list of “requirements” for exemption of a nonprofit hospital.17
In addition to conditions of little relevance here, the ruling explained that such
a hospital “must be operated to the extent of its financial ability for those not
able to pay for the services rendered . . . .”18 The clear implication of the
paragraph was that an exempt hospital was expected to engage in more or less
explicit cross-subsidization among patient groups, with those who could afford
treatment paying for the total costs of operating the hospital, including costs
attributable to care for those who could not afford to pay the full costs, if they
could indeed afford to pay anything at all. A willingness to treat the poor either
at diminished rates or without charge was clearly a paramount consideration:
“It [an exempt hospital] must not, however, refuse to accept patients in need of
hospital care who cannot pay for such services.”19

15. See Daloia v. Franciscan Health Sys., 679 N.E.2d 1084, 1086 (Ohio 1997); David Villar Patton,
The Queen, the Attorney General, and the Modern Charitable Fiduciary: A Historical Perspective on
Charitable Enforcement Reform, 11 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 131, 162 (2000) (referring to the hospital
population as the “sick–poor”).
16. 38 Stat. 168 (1913).
17. Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202, 203–04.
18. Id. The requirements of little interest here related to having organizational documents
specifying charitable purpose, banning private inurement, and so on. The key point for this discussion
is the specific attention devoted to alleviation of the effects of poverty.
19. Id.
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This view was also reflected in a more or less contemporaneous expression
of policy embodied in regulations proposed later the same year.20 These
regulations reflected a relatively narrow view of the “charitable” category,
confined exclusively to relief of the effects of poverty.21 This position does not
appear to have been offered as a departure from prior law, but rather as a
codification of existing practice.22 These regulations were never finalized, but
neither were they supplanted by any contradictory guidance over the next
thirteen years.
In 1969, however, another ruling and regulation did signal an abrupt change
in policy. In Revenue Ruling 69-545, the IRS considered two hypothetical
hospitals that were seeking exemptions.23 As in many revenue rulings, the two
cases were presented as polar pairs, on opposite sides of the line dividing the
good from the bad.24 The surprise was in the liberality with which the IRS
viewed the hypothetical good case. The good case was a community hospital
that had an “open staff”—meaning simply that its facilities were open to any
doctor in the community. It was governed by a board whose membership
consisted of “prominent citizens in the community.”25 The hospital operated an
emergency room that had a policy requiring the care of all who needed
emergency services, but the general patient policy of the hospital was to “limit[]
admissions to those who can pay the cost of their hospitalization [by means of
government assistance, private insurance, or personal resources.]”26 Even
though any cross-subsidy would be quite limited—being confined only to the
emergency room services—the IRS concluded that a hospital of this sort was
entitled to exemption from tax.27
This ruling was quite controversial at the time. Indeed, it was challenged in
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization v. Simon28 by a public-interest
law firm, primarily on the grounds that by so narrowing the range of the
provision of services to indigents, the ruling constituted an impermissible
departure from the language of the Internal Revenue Code.29 In effect, the
argument was that such a hospital could not be considered “charitable” as
20. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(b), 21 Fed. Reg. 460, 464 (Jan. 21, 1956).
21. Id.
22. The ruling in particular contains references to earlier, less general IRS announcements, such as
a 1941 General Counsel’s Memorandum that suggests that the positions in the 1956 ruling, later
reflected in the proposed regulations, were consistent with a continuous ruling position of the
government. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 22,554 (June 21, 1941).
23. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
24. And, again as is often the case, the distance between the polar hypothetical hospitals in this
ruling is so wide that only limited guidance is provided on the precise location of the line separating
qualified hospitals from those that are not.
25. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. at 117. The hypothetical hospital found not to qualify for exempt
status was controlled by the doctors who founded it, was not open to more than a few other doctors,
and had a “relatively inactive” emergency room. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 118.
28. (Simon II), 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
29. Id. at 26.
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required by the statute and was therefore ineligible for exemption under I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3). This argument succeeded at the district court level30 but was
reversed on substantive grounds by the court of appeals.31 Ultimately, an appeal
to the Supreme Court resulted in denial of the claim (vacating the order of the
court of appeals) on grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the
ruling.32
In the same year that it issued Revenue Ruling 69-545, the Treasury/IRS
promulgated new regulations under § 501(c)(3) that expanded the range of
“charitable” far beyond the relief-of-poverty rationale that had prevailed until
that time.33 Together with Revenue Ruling 69-545, these regulations introduced
what came to be known as the “community benefit” standard and recognized
“promotion of health” for the first time as a legitimate basis for tax exemption,
regardless of the financial need of the patient population served.34 Although
hospitals seem to enjoy an especially favorable status under this standard,35 it is
also the case that other categories of nonprofit organizations enjoyed a more
relaxed set of exemption qualifications under these regulations. For example,
organizations designed to “lessen neighborhood tensions,” “defend human and
civil rights secured by law,” and “combat community deterioration and juvenile
delinquency” also found explicit endorsement of their purposes as ones that
could qualify them for exemption under § 501(c)(3).36
In light of the fact that the open emergency room seemed to be the last
remaining link to the relief-of-poverty rationale, it is somewhat surprising that
subsequent rulings eroded even that. In Revenue Ruling 83-157, the IRS ruled
that in the case of specialized hospitals, such as cancer or eye hospitals, in which
emergency rooms are clearly needed less and hence are usually not part of such
hospitals’ facilities, even the open-emergency-room requirement was waived.37
Thus, in the span of less than fifteen years, the standard for exemption went
from one that depended heavily on the general availability of care to the poor

30. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Shultz, 370 F.Supp. 325 (D.D.C. 1973).
31. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon (Simon I), 506 F.2d 1278, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
32. Simon II, 426 U.S. at 26–27.
33. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1990).
34. Neither phrase appears in the regulations themselves, but the ruling reads, in relevant part:
The promotion of health, like the relief of poverty and the advancement of education and
religion, is one of the purposes in the general law of charity that is deemed beneficial to the
community as a whole even though the class of beneficiaries eligible to receive a direct benefit
from its activities does not include all members of the community, such as indigent members
of the community, provided that the class is not so small that its relief is not of benefit to the
community.
Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117, 118. There is no elaboration on the minimum size of the group that
must be benefited in order to qualify as a “community benefit.”
35. See discussion infra note 38 of the subsequent rulings that seem to confer special status on
hospitals.
36. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(2).
37. Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94, 94–95.
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to one in which only emergency care needed to be provided to the poor, and
not even that if special circumstances made that impractical.38
C. Uneven Application of Treasury Principles
Despite the much-liberalized policy on tax exemption of hospitals and the
apparent breadth of the “promotion of health” concept, not all nonprofit
organizations that might seem to qualify under this standard have actually
managed to achieve tax exemption. For example, in Federation Pharmacy
Services, Inc. v. Commissioner,39 a nonprofit firm sold drugs to elderly and
handicapped customers at prices intended to cover only the firm’s costs.40 The
tax court was unimpressed that the drugs were sold at a discount from normal
retail prices, observing that commercial enterprises frequently did the same.41
In sum, the tax court simply thought that this entity was, in fact, engaged in a
commercial activity, even though it was structured in a way that provided
health-related products at below-market prices to a population—the elderly and
handicapped—that could reasonably have been presumed to be
disproportionately poor. Judge Sterrett’s summary says it all:
It is clear that [Federation’s] exclusive purpose . . . is to sell drugs, an activity that is
normally carried on by a commercial profitmaking enterprise[] . . . . We fail to see
how the fact that it happens to deal in drugs [converts] it to a section 501(c)(3)
organization. If it could be so converted, then so could a store selling orthopedic
42
shoes, crutches, health foods, or any other product beneficial to health.

Precisely the problem with this interpretation is that once the IRS had
expressed its sense that hospitals could qualify for exemption largely on
grounds that they served to promote health, one might have thought that
vending drugs, orthopedic shoes, crutches, et cetera, if operated on a nonprofit
basis, would qualify as well. But apparently that is not so, at least in the view of
the tax court.
The story is much the same in the case of health-maintenance organizations
(HMOs). The very name of this category of entities suggests that promotion of
health is what they are about, and at least some of them also have elements of
cross-subsidization that should put them in harmony with the traditional ideas
of charity. But they have not generally fared well in their efforts to achieve tax
38. To be sure, even after 1969 qualification for exemption was not available to any sort of
nonprofit hospital. In addition to the normal exempt-status requirements banning private inurement
and the like, Revenue Rulings 69-545 and 83-157 both make it clear that factors relating to the
openness of the hospital to all physicians in the community, broad community representation on the
board of directors, and the use of any surpluses for research or capital improvements were matters to
be considered in evaluating the case for exemption. See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117, and Rev.
Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94.
39. 72 T.C. 687 (1979), aff’d, 625 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1980).
40. See Fed’n Pharmacy Servs., Inc., 72 T.C. at 689–90 (stating that the elderly and handicapped
were entitled to become “members” of the organization, which entitled them to automatic five percent
discounts, while nonmembers were allowed to purchase drugs, but only at prices that were intended to
replicate the full retail price for such drugs charged by commercial enterprises).
41. Id. at 692.
42. Id. at 691–92.
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exemption.43 The IRS position with respect to HMOs has been consistently
hostile, and in the few cases that have been tried, that position has ordinarily
been sustained by the courts.44 The prominent exception, Sound Health Ass’n.
v. Commissioner,45 involved an HMO that directly operated health care
facilities, and thus to some degree resembled a hospital.
HMOs that merely arrange for the provision of care or for covering its cost,
rather than providing care directly, have not achieved similar success under the
“community benefit” standard. The most recent major decision in this area,
IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Commissioner,46 is useful for its summary of the
community-benefit standard. That standard, as viewed by the Tenth Circuit
panel, requires a health care institution to make its services available to a broad
range of the population within its community, but also requires “some
additional ‘plus.’”47 The amorphous “plus” factor can vary, but the Tenth
Circuit suggested that devoting surpluses to research or teaching, or providing
free or below-cost services, would normally qualify.48 One might argue that
precisely because any need to provide shareholders with a return on equity
investments is absent, a well-managed nonprofit HMO would be able to cover
the cost of medical care at prices that would be at least modestly below market
prices established by commercial insurance companies. Indeed, the tax court
below in this very case found that the HMO’s policies and practices “likely
allowed its enrollees to obtain medical care at a lower cost than might otherwise
have been available.”49 But providing care at below-market cost was not,
apparently, the sort of “plus” factor that the court of appeals was looking for,
and exempt status was denied.50 A similar outcome, with a slightly different
explanation, was reached in the one other case involving an HMO that did not
engage directly in the provision of health care.51

43. The IRS did announce, in 2003, its intention to review its position on the possible exempt status
of HMOs, and to provide further guidance. IRS Notice 2003-31, 2003-1 C.B. 948. To date, however, no
further guidance has been issued.
44. See IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Comm’r, 325 F.3d 1188, 1201–03 (10th Cir. 2003) (denying HMOs
tax exemption because they did not operate for purpose of promoting health for benefit of community,
and because the HMOs were found not to be an integral part of affiliated tax-exempt hospital division);
see also Geisinger Health Plan v. Comm’r, 985 F.2d 1210, 1219 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that HMOs that
provided no significant benefits to anyone other than their paying subscribers did not qualify for taxexempt status).
45. 71 T.C. 158 (1978), acq., 1981-2 C.B. 1, action on dec., 1981-127 (June 10, 1981).
46. 325 F.3d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 2003).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. IHC Group, Inc. v. Comm’r, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 606, 615 (2001).
50. IHC Health Plans, Inc., 325 F.3d at 1204.
51. See Geisinger Health Plan v. Comm’r, 985 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1993) (concluding that the HMO,
despite having a subsidized dues plan for low-income members, was not entitled to exemption). A later
case involving the same plan, Geisinger Health Plan v. Comm’r (Geisinger II), decided upon remand
that the HMO could not qualify for exemption on the basis of its relationship with other entities that
were exempt. 30 F.3d 494 (3d Cir. 1994). See also I.R.S. Technical Advice Memorandum 98-37129, in
which the IRS considered the status of an HMO and found it not qualified for exemption on similar
grounds.
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Thus the current state of the law in this area can only be characterized as
incoherent. Beginning from a historical position in which subsidized health care
was the touchstone for exemption, we have moved to a position in which
subsidized health care was neither necessary (as in the case of the cancer
hospital) nor sufficient (as in the cases of HMOs and the nonprofit drug store).
None of this movement was based on statutory change, though of course the
promulgation of regulations consistent with the Internal Revenue Code and the
decisions of our courts carry the full force of law. But that law makes little
sense from a policy perspective. It is law that provides tax subsidies to
organizations that institutionalize some degree of cross-subsidization of care
and favors organizations that promote health, but not in a consistent manner.
Further, to the degree that some shred of the cross-subsidy flavor remains in
the law, it is worth asking whether even that still makes sense in a health care
system in which federal and state governments have largely assumed the burden
of financing the cost of medical care for the poorest segment of our population
(through Medicaid52) and the segment of our population that generally requires
the greatest amount of medical care, the elderly (through Medicare53). Under
such circumstances, cross-subsidies may involve, for example, situations in
which the modestly compensated hourly employees of large employers are
subsidizing the health care costs of better-compensated independent
contractors who may not carry health insurance, such as real-estate sales
workers, smaller construction contractors, or even lawyers in private practice.54
Whether this sort of upside-down cross-subsidy is the norm or not, it is clearly
among the possibilities under current rules and interpretations, casting serious
doubt on the validity of the arguments for exempt status of those health care
institutions that succeed in achieving that status.
III
THE IMPACT OF THE SUBSIDIES
But does any of this matter? To put it another way, are the tax subsidies
available to certain health care institutions significant enough to make much of
a difference? A shorthand answer, to be detailed a bit more below, is that the
subsidies are not trivial and could make a difference at the margin in some
cases. But the subsidies are probably not of a magnitude that would make them
a dominant force in the economics of health care in the United States.
A. How Do the Subsidies Work?
A brief description of the tax features that provide subsidies to those
institutions that achieve exemption will be helpful in assessing the importance

52. Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396–1396v (2000).
53. Health Insurance for the Aged Act (Medicare Act), Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 290 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
54. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 20–21.
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of these features. Considered here will be the effects of (1) the exemption from
federal income taxes of qualifying nonprofit health care institutions;55 (2) the
opportunity for donors to such institutions to deduct their donations from their
income for federal income-tax purposes;56 and (3) the opportunity of exempt
health care institutions to issue bonds whose interest payments are excluded
from federal income taxes.57 These features are ordinarily replicated in various
state statutes providing similar exemptions, deductions, and exclusions from
state income taxes, but not uniformly so.58 A number of other ancillary features
associated with exempt status are likely to be of benefit to exempt health care
institutions, such as exemption from state and local sales and property taxes,59
favorable postal rates, etc.60 Although these are no doubt of considerable value
to the institutions that qualify, they are too diffuse to be considered
comprehensively in a paper of this scope. Instead, only the supply-side federal
income-tax elements of the nonprofit medical-services industry will be
examined here.
B. The Exemption
The first element of subsidy is of course the exemption itself, under I.R.C. §
501(c)(3). This provision exempts the qualifying institution from whatever
income tax that would otherwise apply, which in almost all cases is the
corporate income tax under I.R.C. § 11.61 It seems as though this would be a
benefit of great significance, and in some cases it may be. But it is useful to
remember that precisely because the institutions in question are organized as
nonprofit corporations, they are under no pressure to produce any net income
for shareholders that would be subject to tax. And many probably do not. The
latest statistics available indicate that health organizations filing information
55. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2005).
56. I.R.C. § 170 (2005).
57. I.R.C. § 103(a) (2005) exempts interest paid on certain bonds from inclusion in the gross
income of the recipient, as long as the bonds are “qualified bonds.” I.R.C. § 141(e)(1)(G) (2005) makes
it clear that “qualified 501(c)(3) bonds” are within this exemption. A qualified 501(c)(3) bond is
defined in I.R.C. § 145(a) (2005) to include any bond issued by an organization exempted under I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3), subject to a few conditions that are not salient here.
58. An encyclopedic summary of state laws on these questions is beyond the scope of this article,
but the following examples from the laws of North Carolina will serve as illustrations: North Carolina
allows nonprofit charitable organizations an exemption from the state corporate income tax. N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 105-130.11(a) (West 1998). And, by incorporating the federal definition of income into
the North Carolina personal income tax, it effectively allows deductions from state income taxes for
charitable contributions to the extent those contributions are deductible for federal income tax
purposes. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 105-134.5(a) (2005).
59. Again using North Carolina as an illustration, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 105-164.14(b) (1995)
allows exempt organizations to obtain refunds of sales taxes paid. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 105-275(7)
(2003) exempts real and personal property of such organizations from the reach of taxes otherwise
applicable to holdings of those properties.
60. The favorable postal rates for exempt organizations are described at 39 U.S.C.A. §§ 3626. See
also I.R.C. § 3306(c)(8) (2005), which exempts charitable organizations from federal employment taxes.
61. Very infrequently, a hospital or other organization might be organized as a charitable trust, in
which case I.R.C. § 1(e) (2005) would be the operative tax provision from which the organization was
exempt.
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returns with the IRS for the 2002 tax year reported total revenue of about $550
billion, and total expenses of $541 billion.62 Although this yields a (nontrivial)
net-income figure of $9 billion, the total revenue figure included some $41
billion of contributions, grants, and gifts, most of which would not be
considered as part of gross income under the usual income tax rules.63 Thus,
allowing for the exclusion of most of the latter figure would put health
organizations into a net-loss position in the aggregate. Further, exempt
organizations have no reason, so long as they are indeed exempt, to undertake
even the slightest efforts at tax minimization. For example, although the annual
tax return filed by charities allows them to take deductions for depreciation of
their buildings and equipment, a charity would have no reason to seek the
maximum deductions possible in circumstances that would permit a range of
options as to depreciation methods to business taxpayers. Similarly, because
there is no tax amount against which credits could be claimed, there is not even
a line item for such credits on the charitable organizations’ return.64 Thus, one
imagines that if hospitals were suddenly to lose their exempt status, they would
be able to arrange their affairs in such a way that they would have an even
greater deficit, in the aggregate.
Of course, aggregate negative numbers would not be inconsistent with the
possibility that some hospitals, in some years, would achieve significant profits.
But another feature of the income tax as applied to businesses may then come
into play: the opportunity to net profits and losses across years, using net
operating-loss deductions accumulated in loss years to offset income in up to
two preceding and twenty following years.65 Thus, even among hospitals
sometimes showing a profit, only those that consistently do so over time would
be exposed to any ultimate tax liabilities.
There is no question that such hospitals are rare, and there is further no
doubt that those lucky few are grateful for their exemption from income tax.
The aggregate numbers, however, together with one’s conjectures about what
the aggregate numbers would look like if nonprofit hospitals had an incentive to
undertake even a modest amount of tax planning, suggest that not much
revenue is lost due to the exemption. Since the subsidy inheres in the lost
62. Internal Revenue Serv., Charities and Other Tax-Exempt Organizations, 2002, 25 STAT.
INCOME BULL. 263, 264 (Fall 2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/02eochar.pdf.
Organizations other than churches must, pursuant to I.R.C. § 6033(a), file an annual return (IRS Form
990), on which this report is based, unless their income is generally less than $25,000. See DEP’T OF
THE TREASURY I.R.S., FORM 990: RETURN OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX (2005),
available at http://www.irs.gov.pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf. It is thus safe to assume that these data include all
nonprofit hospitals.
63. Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 62, at 264. I.R.C. § 102 allows a broad exclusion for
amounts received as gifts. It is possible that some grants, however, might not qualify for this exclusion,
so some part of the $41 billion in this category could imaginably be included in income for tax purposes
if the organization receiving it were not exempt.
64. Among the credits for which hospitals might be able to qualify would be the research credit
under 26 U.S.C.A. § 41(a), the employer-provided-childcare credit under 26 U.S.C.A. § 45F(a), the
work-opportunity credit under I.R.C. § 51(a), and a number of others.
65. I.R.C. § 172 (2005).
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revenue, we can safely conclude that federal tax subsidies directly due to taxexempt status are not likely to be a significant force affecting the market for
health services. Notably, the federal government makes no estimate of the “tax
expenditure”—roughly, the revenue foregone because of favorable tax features
that deviate from an ideal income tax—associated with exempt status for health
care institutions.66 This is probably because exemption could itself be
considered among the baseline features of the tax system, so there is no
deviation from the norm involved.67
C. Charitable Contributions Deductions
In contrast, the deduction available for charitable gifts to qualifying
nonprofit health care institutions constitutes a clear, and measurable, subsidy.
This tax feature is technically independent of the institution’s status under
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) because the charitable contributions deduction has its own set
of rules, and its own criteria for deductibility, under I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B).
However, the language of the latter section is virtually identical to section
501(c)(3), for all purposes relevant here.68
The ordinary workings of the charitable contribution deduction are
straightforward: if a donor gives a dollar to a charitable organization, such as a
qualifying nonprofit hospital, that amount can be deducted from gross income,
yielding a savings equal to that one dollar times the taxpayer’s marginal tax
rate. At the moment, marginal tax rates run up to thirty-five percent, so a
contributed dollar may result in a tax savings to the donor of up to thirty-five
cents. This could be characterized as a matching-grant program, under which
the government pays up to thirty-five cents for every sixty-five cents
contributed by the private donor.69 Corporate donors face much the same
deduction arithmetic, since medium and large corporations are taxed at
marginal rates of either thirty-four percent or thirty-five percent.70 Of course,
some donors are in lower tax brackets and receive correspondingly lesser
benefits.71 And, because the charitable contributions deduction is an itemized

66. See OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2006 , at 316 (2006), available at http://a255.g.akamaitech.net/
7/255/2422/07feb20051415/www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy06/pdf/spec.pdf.
67. For a full development of this view, see Boris I. Bittker and George K. Rahdert, The
Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299 (1976).
Reduced to its essentials, this article demonstrates that the federal-income-tax principles and rules were
simply not designed to tax any excess of receipts over disbursements in any annual period that might be
achieved by an exempt organization.
68. See discussion supra note 13.
69. Sixty-five cents is the appropriate denominator, rather than one dollar, because the net burden
to the donor of making a gross gift of one dollar is that one dollar less the thirty-five cents of tax
savings.
70. I.R.C. § 11 (2005).
71. Currently, tax rates range from as low as ten percent up to the thirty-five percent maximum
rate.
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deduction, those taxpayers who do not itemize their deductions receive no tax
benefits from their contributions at all.72
In some cases, the benefits of contributions can be even greater because
donors can ordinarily deduct the fair market value of appreciated property that
they contribute to charities. Suppose, for example, that an entrepreneur has
$1000 of founder’s stock with a negligible basis that he is considering selling or
contributing. If he sells, he will face a capital gains tax of, typically, fifteen
percent, leaving $850 after that tax. If he contributes the stock, he will not be
taxed on the capital gain, and he will be able to shelter $1000 of unrelated
income with a deduction for the contribution of $1000 of property, generating
as much as $350 of tax savings. Thus, the net cost of making the gift under these
assumptions may be as little as $500 for a $1000 gift, which resembles a 100%
matching grant program.73
Although this treatment is quite favorable, its impact on the health care
industry is limited by the fact that health care institutions do not seem to be
among the favorite targets of donors. Because taxpayers are not required to
disclose the names of their charitable donees, no official information on the
amount of contributions can be compiled. A recent and widely respected
estimate, however, is that charitable gifts to the health subsector were just
under $22 billion in 2004.74 This is roughly consistent with the Office of
Management and Budget’s estimate of the amount of federal revenue foregone
due to charitable contributions to health organizations, which is that such gifts
were associated with a revenue loss of a bit over $3 billion in fiscal year 2004,
and with about $3.7 billion in fiscal year 2006.75
The impact of the contribution deduction on the economics of health care is
thus not large in the aggregate, and it is even further diminished by the fact that
72. In 2003, 33.7% of all individual taxpayers itemized their returns. Author calculations based on
tables 1 and 3, Michael Parisi and Scott Hollenbeck, supra note 6. “However, the decision to itemize is
closely linked to income, with 85.2% of taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes exceeding $75,000 being
itemizers.” Id. Hence, while a minority of taxpayers itemize, it is reasonable to infer that a majority of
contributed dollars are deducted by itemizers who obtain some tax benefits from making their
contributions.
73. To make the arithmetic a bit more explicit, assume taxpayer has a $1000 gain and $1000 of
unrelated income. The total tax will be as much as $150 on the gain and $350 on the unrelated income,
leaving $1500 after tax. If she gives away the $1000 asset instead of selling it, both taxes are avoided,
leaving the $1000 of unrelated income intact. This outcome, $1000 of after-tax income, is only $500
worse than the result that would have obtained had no gift been made at all.
74. CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY AT INDIANA UNIV., GIVING USA 2005: THE ANNUAL REPORT ON
PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR 2004, at 123 (2005).
75. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, supra note 66, at 318. The precise estimates were $3090
million in FY 2004 and $3670 million in FY 2006. Id. Each federal fiscal year begins in October of the
preceding numbered year and runs through September of the numbered year. For example, FY 2006
runs from October 1, 2005 through September 30, 2006. The revenue loss is “roughly consistent” with a
much larger gross-giving estimate, because the tax loss is no more than the marginal rate of tax times
the amount of the gift. See RICHARD SCHMALBECK AND LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION, at 356 (2004). Also, some gifts are made by individuals who do not itemize their
deductions, by individuals whose contributions are nondeductible because they exceed the limitations
of I.R.C. § 170(b) on individual deductions (which generally limit deductions to no more than fifty
percent of the donor’s adjusted gross income), or by other tax-exempt institutions. Id.
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much of what is given is specifically designated for medical research or
international programs, not for the direct provision of medical care to
Americans.76
D. Tax-exempt Financing
The final member of the trio of favorable supply-side tax features is the
opportunity provided to qualifying nonprofit health care institutions to borrow
money for capital projects by issuing bonds whose interest payments are exempt
from federal income tax. I.R.C. § 103(a) permits the exclusion of interest paid
with respect to state and local government bonds, and § 103(b), in effect,
extends that favorable treatment to any of several types of “qualified bonds,”
among which are “501(c)(3) bonds,” which are described in I.R.C. § 145.
Unsurprisingly, “501(c)(3) bonds” are those that finance property owned by
organizations described in I.R.C. section 501(c)(3),77 so qualification to issue
such bonds is essentially automatic upon grant of the basic tax exemption.
Although there is a state-by-state volume cap on the issuance of all “private
activity bonds,”78 (of which section 501(c)(3) bonds are a subcategory), the
501(c)(3) bonds are exempt from that cap.79 Until 1997, there were limits on
bond financing imposed on each institution.80 But even under those limits,
hospitals were treated favorably, being exempt from the institutional limits as
long as ninety-five percent of any particular bond issue was devoted to hospital
construction.81
Exemption of the interest on 501(c)(3) bonds from income taxation of
course allows issuers of such bonds to market them at rates of return that are
somewhat lower than issuers of otherwise comparable bonds would need to
pay, thus lowering the capital costs of the institutions endowed with this
privilege. The Office and Management and Budget estimates that the federal
subsidy, in terms of foregone revenue due to the interest exemption feature,
will amount to about $2.2 billion in fiscal year 2006.82

76. For example, by far the largest gifts to the health subsector in recent years have been those
made by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, which have focused on research and treatment efforts
targeted at AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis epidemics, largely in third-world regions. See CTR. ON
PHILANTHROPY AT INDIANA UNIV. supra note 74, at 126–27.
77. See I.R.C. § 145(a)(1) (“[A]ll property which is to be provided by the net proceeds of the issue
is to be owned by a 501(c)(3) organization or a governmental unit . . . .”).
78. I.R.C. § 146(a).
79. I.R.C. § 146(g)(2).
80. The limit was a fairly generous $150 million of bonded indebtedness outstanding at any one
time per institution. See I.R.C. § 145(b) (2000). This provision is still in the Code, but is subject to a
built-in expiration of effectiveness by the terms of I.R.C. § 145(b)(5), which was added in 1997.
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (1997).
81. I.R.C. § 145(b)(1).
82. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, supra note 66, at 318 (stating the precise estimate at $2160
million).
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IV
CONCLUSION
Thus, the three supply-side subsidies provided through the federal tax rules
do not, even cumulatively, bring any very impressive forces to bear on the
market for health care. Exemption from taxation surely saves some institutions
some tax they would otherwise pay, but most institutions would likely be able,
by careful tax planning or, more commonly, by having genuinely unprofitable
operations, to avoid all or most of the tax. Indirect subsidies provided to health
care institutions by the deductibility of contributions to them, and the exclusion
of interest paid by them, are not trivial, but add up to less than seven billion
dollars per year—hardly of much significance in an industry whose contribution
to the gross domestic product now exceeds two trillion dollars per year.83
One way of putting the supply-side subsidies in perspective is presented by
the Office of Management and Budget’s list of the top tax expenditures, which
ranks the various departures from an ideal income tax in terms of their
budgetary effects over the next five fiscal years.84 At the very top of the list,
hundreds of billions of dollars ahead of the next-most-expensive item, is the
exclusion of employer contributions for medical insurance and medical care,
amounting to over $760 billion.85 This, of course, is the centerpiece of the
demand-side subsidy discussed elsewhere in this volume.86 In contrast, the
charitable-contribution deduction ranks twenty-ninth at a total cost of about $21
billion over the same period;87 and the exclusion of interest on hospital
construction bonds ranks thirty-ninth, at a total cost of less than $12 billion over
this period.88
It seems likely, however, that despite the relatively modest dollar value of
the federal subsidies on the supply side, the presence of substantial numbers of
nonprofit institutions affects the market for medical services in a variety of
ways. For example, it seems possible that in an oligopolistic market, the
presence of a significant number of providers whose pricing structures may
include explicit efforts to cross-subsidize one group of users through abovemarket charges imposed on other users might create something of a pricing
“umbrella” that could be mimicked by the profit-seeking entities in the same
market. The mimicking, however, would likely not involve similar crosssubsidies; that is, the profit-seeking entities might employ the “subsidizing”
price schedule where the market would bear that structure, without using the
surplus created thereby to subsidize anyone but their own shareholders.
Similarly, it is possible that inefficiencies that some suspect afflict nonprofit

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 12.
OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, supra note 66, at 324–26.
Id. at 324.
Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 36–39; Zelenak, supra note 7, at 109–20.
OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, supra note 66, at 324.
Id.
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entities in particular could provide a similar pricing umbrella for the profitseeking competitors in the same region.
It is also possible that nonprofit hospitals have become repositories of stores
of assets that are in excess of any reasonable capital needs of the health care
industry. This could be the result of enjoying monopoly profits, and, in effect,
having nothing else to do with them (because of the ban on distributions of
profits) than to invest them internally.89 This is, however, very difficult to
demonstrate with available accounting data. As noted earlier,90 the annual
reports filed by nonprofit hospitals with the IRS show little if any aggregate
surplus.
To be sure, “shadow surpluses” could be hidden in either or both of two
ways: the potential availability of surpluses could simply lessen pressures on
expenses, so that expenses effectively rise to meet the revenues; alternatively or
in addition, some of the “expense” could be in the form of depreciation allowed
with respect to capital expansions that may be unnecessary, and would in any
event have been foregone but for the potential presence of monopoly profits
that make expansions feasible. The process could be this: nonprofit hospitals
can charge more for their services than those services would cost if efficiently
provided, and so they do. The excess is either absorbed in inefficiency or used
to pay the debt service on bonds—themselves issued under favorable terms—
used to finance unnecessary expansion of the hospital’s capital plant.91
So nonprofit hospitals could be awash with potential surpluses that are
never reflected in their financial reports. This may be an instance of a failure to
prove a negative: the presence of surpluses might prove the presence of
monopoly profits, but the absence of surpluses cannot prove the absence of
monopoly profits.
But even if there are “shadow” monopoly profits in the nonprofit hospital
subsector, it is unclear what the effects of those monopoly profits may be. Some
may be quite benign. For example, it is likely that some of the shadow surplus
is consumed by the research budgets of university hospitals.92 If and to the
degree that this is what is going on, it is hardly problematic. Basic research is
rich in positive externalities: it often leads to profitable applications, but it is
usually not profitable in itself. Recognition of this provides one of the
justifications for tax subsidies of basic research.93
89. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 23.
90. See text and notes at supra note 61.
91. Of course, this possibility would be sporadically constrained by certificate-of-need
requirements imposed by various state authorities. See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 61.
92. Havighurst and Richman report estimates that $20–25 billion is spent by hospitals on medical
education and research. See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 21 n.36.
93. Note that scientific research is one of the purposes that may be pursued by organizations
exempt from tax under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). One may object at this point that the subsidy for basic
research is coming from the pockets of the insured employees whose premiums pay for medical services
set at monopoly prices. See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 20–21. But those premiums are
paid with pre-tax dollars, rather than being paid with post-tax dollars, as most consumption is. It is
difficult to be certain about the magnitudes involved on either side of this trade-off, but it is not
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But in that most nonprofit hospitals do not pursue significant research
agendas, this explanation is at best reassuring only as to a small part of
whatever shadow surpluses may exist. It must be admitted that more probable
candidates to explain the bulk of shadow surpluses are either simply waste—
due to the combination of inefficiency and lack of budget pressures—or bloat—
an accumulation of excessive amounts of capital within the nonprofit hospital
subsector. What if the structure of the nonprofit-hospital subsector is rife with
either or both of these?
Waste is difficult to defend. But it may be worth noting that if the health
care industry is, in effect, rigged, so that monopoly profits are available, and can
be leveraged by the addition to the mix of third-party payer moral hazards,94
then the presence of nonprofit participants in the market may simply reduce the
monopoly profits available to the for-profit participants. Waste is still waste,
and it might be preferable to have for-profits enjoy even higher profits if the
alternative is dead-weight loss due to waste. But from the point of view of
consumers in this market, it may not make much difference: monopoly prices
will prevail, whether the benefits of that are enjoyed by shareholders of forprofit providers, or wasted by nonprofit ones.
Bloat is an equally unattractive characterization, but it too must be analyzed
within the context of the health care industry overall. If bloat occurs because
nonprofits have nowhere else to go with their surpluses, one must ask what
influence that might have on the for-profit participants in the same market?
They suffer no comparable barrier to the distribution of accumulated capital
within the provider entities; they are free to pay dividends if they wish. In most
industries, there is an optimal level of capital investment—higher in competitive
industries, lower in monopolized ones. If the health-services industry behaves
according to this principle, then the overinvestment by nonprofits may well be
offset by lesser capital investments by for-profit firms in the industry, so that the
overall level of capital investment remains optimal.95 One might expect to see
nonprofits in this scenario to be more likely to have expensive, but relatively
infrequently used, items of equipment, while for-profits confine their capital
expenditures to items that are reasonably sure to experience high demand.
Of course, a fundamental premise of this symposium is that the health care
industry is not like other monopolized industries, particularly in the sense that
exploitation of the monopoly opportunities does not take the usual form of
reduced output at higher prices. The third-party-payer situation arguably
makes possible both the charging of monopoly prices and the expansion of
output. If that is the case, then there may be no natural optimum of capital

unreasonable to imagine that the savings from the pre-tax feature offset the lost consumer surplus due
to monopoly pricing.
94. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 20–25.
95. Again, certificate-of-need requirements, being based on all facilities in a geographic area,
whether for-profit or not, would operate as overall constraints. Thus, overinvestment by nonprofits
would tend to constrain investment by for-profit firms.
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invested in the industry. However, if that is true, one must ask again whether
the presence of nonprofit providers in the industry makes any difference. If the
incentives toward bloat are built into the context—in particular here, the taxsubsidized third-party payer problem—will they not affect for-profit firms in
much the way they affect nonprofit firms? And if so, does the mix of the two
types matter? And does it ultimately make any difference that nonprofit firms
have an additional constraint that virtually obligates them to pursue bloat as a
more or less conscious strategy?
These questions certainly deserve exploration, although they may not be
amenable to conclusive resolution. But framing them as I have done in this
concluding section brings me back to some of the points emphasized in the
preceding ones. In particular, it would seem that the primary forces that lead to
the bizarre features of the American health care market are not ones that have
much to do with the exempt status of some of the providers within that market.
Rather, they have to do with the dominance of third-party payers financed by
pre-tax dollars. Solving the mysteries of this market may involve, as it often
does in detective fiction, following the money. And the real money in this
industry is in the tax-subsidized third-party payers.

